Security: What the sandbox allows, where keys live, and how to report a vulnerability. # Security > What the sandbox allows, where keys live, and how to report a vulnerability. The server runs code that a model wrote, and it treats that code as untrusted. ## The sandbox * **No access to your computer.** A program has no network, file system, environment, or subprocess access. * **A check before the run.** The server parses each program and rejects imports, `eval`, and references to host globals. * **An isolated runtime.** The program runs in a fresh V8 isolate, or in a separate Deno process with no permissions. With sign-in, the server uses the Deno process only. * **A deadline that the server owns.** The server stops a run that passes its time limit. * **One way out.** A program reaches USPTO only through the registered read methods of the `odp` and `tsdr` SDK. ## Keys * Keys stay in the server process. The server never passes them into the sandbox. * If USPTO echoes a key back, the server replaces it with `[REDACTED]` in results and errors. * In account mode, one person’s key never serves another person’s calls. ## What the server does not do * It does not change anything at USPTO. All three tools are read-only. * It does not download document PDFs or bulk files. The SDK returns their URLs. ## Report a vulnerability Do not open a public issue. Open a [private security advisory](https://github.com/blen-labs/uspto-mcp-server/security/advisories/new). The full policy and the threat model are in [SECURITY.md](https://github.com/blen-labs/uspto-mcp-server/blob/main/SECURITY.md).